Intro – Hi, welcome to The Westasian. This is Beste Macaes and in this episode of The Westasian we are talking to the world renowned expert on geopolitics Dr. Parag Khanna on an incredible subject, the new geopolitical space, West Asia. I personally learnt a lot and I can`t wait to share it with you. So let ́s begin...
Beste Maçaes – Thank you very much Dr. Parag Khanna for being with The Westasian, today.
Dr. Parag Khanna – My pleasure.
Beste Maçaes (B.M.) – I guess the appropriate way to start is to define West Asia. You ́ve been very vocal about the term and the concept. So what is West Asia for you and what are its boundaries, if it has any?
Dr. Parag Khanna (P.K.) – Well, I think It`s very important to begin by pointing out that West Asia is not a contested concept with geography. West Asia is fundamentally geographic. It`s defined as including, what some call the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf states, all the way to the Anatolian Peninsula, the Caucasus region are part of West Asia. Certainly, the South Westasian countries such as Iran and Pakistan are part of this Westasian concept, as well. What might be disputed politically is whether Russia forms North Westasia or North Asia. Of course, Russia is an anomaly in terms of its political geography but in terms of natural geography, geographers include Russia in Asia. But geography, itself is perfectly clear on what constitutes West Asia and Asia. And I feel that, when people have written about Asia for the past 20 years or more, they have basically been looking at Greater China. Because of that skewed understanding, which is really a political frame or a geopolitical frame, they have ignored the geography, itself. If you ́re being loyal to the concept that stems from geography, there really is not a debate about the boundaries and the regions that are included in this idea of Asia and West Asia.
B.M. - Obviously, conflict in the region is a major issue. What is the role of conflict in the West Asian system?
P.K. - The role of conflict is quite defining. Let`s remember that a region can be peaceful or conflictual. That doesn`t mean that it isn`t a coherent geographical region or that it isn`t a system. One of the points that I emphasize very strongly in the beginning of The Future is Asian, which is that a system actually has a very formal meaning in IR Theory and it`s a measurement of the intensity of relations between actors. They can be violent relations. Europe has been a system for many centuries and it has been a violent and conflictual system for most of that history, as well. But it is still a very much a system. Now, Asia, has never been referred to in the literature, in theory or in history work as a system and that is a huge oversight. You never see the word Asia and system, next to each other. That was one of my principle motivations was to explore to what extend is Asia, a system. It turns out that Asia is very much a system. The degree of diplomatic and economic interaction, institutions, infrastructure between Asian countries is larger than Asia`s collective relations with any other part of the world. By the absolute, most formal definition of a system, Asia a system. Yet, no one has ever bothered to treat Asia as a system. We tend to take these subregions, for example, East Asia, Pacific Asia, Southeast Asia and for the purposes of our conversation West Asia or Southwest Asia. Indeed, Southwest Asia is most certainly been a system for many periods of history. It`s been a system during the times of caliphates. It`s been a system during the colonial eras, even when divide. d among European powers, it still had system-like characteristics, in terms of the conflicts between colonial powers in the region. So even in Napoleonic era there is system attributes. Of course, under the Ottoman Empire, it was very much politically part of the Ottoman system. Therefore, most certainly, belonging to one integrated polity. Now, even as a set of independent states whether we`re talking about Turkey, the Gulf or the Levant region, or Iran and Pakistan. We, then even can extend into Central Asia, what we are witnessing is incrementally and bit by bit, the restoration of the system-like characteristics based on sovereignty. Sovereign countries, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf states, Iran, Pakistan and others are rekindling ties with each other. They are finding their economic complementarities. They are building infrastructure with each other. They are fighting wars with each other, as well. Refugee flows, trade relations, illicit trade are evidence of system-like characteristics.
B.M. -Couple of years ago you proposed the concept of West Asia to an Arab forum. What were the reactions, how did they take that?
P.K. - Well, I was simply reminding them that they live in the West Asian geography. Therefore, they are geographically Westasians. One of the things I do in the book, I say, Australians are white Asians. Because, Asia does not mean a particular culture, it does not confer a particular political hegemony. It ́s simply a geographical reference. So, Australians are white Asians. Japanese are Asians. Russians are Asians and indeed, I was telling the Arabs, basically the Gulf Arabs, you are a Westasian. It wasn ́t a proposal. It was a statement of fact. To them, of course it was a political statement because I was reminding them of their geography, because my purpose at that forum was to explore and to quantify and to look at the future of trends when it comes to relations between West Asia and East Asia. Whether it is the energy trade with the Pacific Rim, whether it is the Belt and Road Initiative, a new overland infrastructures that are connecting these markets, whether it is investment trade, whether its strategic and military ties, the deepening relations between West Asia and East Asia have really intensified in the past three decades, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Much of what I ́ve been writing about is the story of how far Asia has come in becoming a system, in precisely last 30 years and what scenarios or potential lie ahead. Arabs can very much be Westasians. Turks are absolutely, Westasians. You can call yourselves Anatolians, you can call yourselves Turks but you ́re geographically speaking the populations that presently reside in the West Asian geography. So, in that sense, it wasn`t a political statement. But of course, it has this very strong political overtones. For all Arabs who are alive, today, they can remember themselves only as being in the so- called Middle East. Because their geography, their political cartography has been so overwhelmingly defined by the divisions imposed on them by the European colonial era and by the nomenclature of this phrase "Middle East". But let ́s remember that if you are in India, in the Ministry of External Affairs, for example, it ́s the Division of West Asian Relations. It is not called the Middle East. East of the Middle East call it the West Asia, and they ́ve always called it West Asia. So, I think we ́re part of this story of a last 30 years and perhaps the next 30 years is evolving beyond the inherited cartographic nomenclature that we are accustomed to and going back to the more natural and accurate vocabulary, which is to refer to West Asia as West Asia. The more I work with Arab governments and academic institutions and the community, more broadly, the more I see that, in their day-to-day lives, they already know that their relations in the real tangible sense far more intense with geographies and countries to the East than to the West. But intellectually they ́re still trapped in the prison of using vocabulary like Middle East. But over time these discrepancies, I think will iron themselves, out.
B.M. - Why is a conceptual shift in terminology from the Middle East to West Asia, an important one to make? Is it a psychological shift?
P.K. - Absolutely... It is psychological and that which is psychological has as much of an overhang and effect on our strategic thinking and the decisions we make, the options that we build for ourselves, priorities that we set, as it does for individuals. Every bit is important to use the correct vocabulary and definitions in having actor the outlook in IR and as it is in interpersonal relations. Words matter. Psychology matters. But that doesn ́t mean it is some kind of a mission that I am on or other people are on. It ́s simply a statement of reality. It ́s not a cause. I applaud you for creating a portal and a publication called The Westasian because it is a sign of the times. But we ́re doing this because it is accurate, because it is correct. It is part of this transition that the region is on.
B.M. - Do you see any country or event taking the lead or accelerating the shift from the Middle East to West Asia?
P.K. - There isn ́t what you might think of as a noble or progressive, singular state actor that is producing an overarching for West Asia to which all parties subscribe. I would like to see something like that. I and many others have proposed that there be, a Gulf Security Conference. That countries in the region whether it is Iran, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others form an association, not even an association, because that would be too strong of a word given the hostility between players in the region. But simply a forum. Some people refer to six-party talks with North Korea, as perhaps a template. As you very well know, at this point in time, it would be a huge accomplishment to have Iran and Israel, actually talk directly to each other in the same room. And to have Saudi Arabia, Emirates and Turkey there, of course, would be very important. So, the geography should be dictating which players set the terms of the conversation rather than whether the United States wants Iran, there or not. For example, I worked many times at Pakistan. In Pakistan, US foreign policy -meaning in the last 15 to 20 years- often shape the relationship they can have. I found a huge discrepancy between Pakistani outlook that they need to have a gas pipeline from Iran to bridge their energy shortages and that they ́ve religious, cultural and demographic ties and of course, a very long border with Iran. But the United States never allow it. In any of the discussions in the post 9/11 security environment as it pertains to Central Asia and the so-called AfPak. The truth is that the AfPak was, AfPak - Iran. But for 15 years, you literally could not have an AfPak Iran - US discussion. But its just a denial of geography to conduct your diplomacy that way. So again, another reason why words matter. We need to have a Westasian Forum of some kind and it has to involve every country in West Asia. That does include Israel and Iran. When I talk of inclusions of these countries, as I think we agree, there isn ́t one that stands out as the leader, a neutral arbiter or convener of these states, in a manner that everyone will subscribe to. China can`t do it, Russia can`t do it, Europe still has a colonial after taste, individual European countries still pick their favorites and of course, America has lost pretty much all credibility. So how could you instantiate or bring to life such a forum is the challenge that we face right now. I would like to see all Westasian countries do that. Perhaps that ́s something you will do.
B.M. - It is a really hard task. Diplomats and scholars, even in Turkey, they are very much reserved about the idea of West Asia. They are still not comfortable referring to themselves in that way which is surprising to me. Because everything that I see lately about Turkey, is somewhat going in that direction. At least from the pro-government side of things, they still prefer to call themselves Middle Eastern, for some reason.
P.K. - Is that true? I ́ve been looking at the Turkish foreign policy for a long time and terminologies have been used like "Neo-Ottomanism" or "360° strategy" and at different times, even during the Erdogan period, these terms have been used. What they all basically connote is a desire to build stable ties with Russia to the North and countries at the Caucasus, all the way to the Turkic countries of Central Asia. And of course, have decisive impact on the future shape of the political map of Syria and Iraq. On again and off again relations with Israel. Economic ties being strong with Gulf countries, even though the political ties are very poor, being on opposite side of different conflicts. So, whether we call it Neo-Ottomanism or 360° strategy, it basically is all indicative of the fact that Turkey no longer sees itself as aspiring to EU membership, to being officially included in the "Western club" and therefore very much has realized that it is a West Asian country and that Asia is its future, as much as any other trajectory. So it doesn ́t matter if a Turkish diplomat says: "Okay, we are now Westasian and now we have a West Asian strategy." The fact is, that ́s exactly what Turkey is actually doing and I think that ́s what matters.
B.M. - Yes, absolutely, I think following the failed military coup-attempt in 2016, all the foreign policy objectives and agenda have shifted. And maybe the coup-attempt was the driver of that shift. But I think, what I ́m referring to is that the concept of West Asia in Turkish foreign policy was initially introduced by the leftist political actors. Therefore, I believe, their reservations are of domestic concerns of being associated with parties that they would not feel comfortable with.
You previously mentioned that "The countries and nations in the region would not fall for a new Cold War scenario." Does that also mean that you think the Westasian process is irreversible? Is West Asia irreversible?
P.K. - I think that the geographical intensity or going back to this idea of a system, West Asia becoming an ever more intensely interrelated, which is again not to say positively integrated but simply interdependent system, that I think is irreversible. You ́ve seen it already in energy trade, we see it in conflictual issues around settling borders. We see it in migration flows, obviously and I think it ́s worth reminding everyone that the flow of Syrians and Iraqis to the West, to Turkey and across Turkey is very much as formal evidence of the system-like characteristics. When you have millions of people flowing across a nominal, arbitrary political border in to a neighbouring country, that is a system. Again, its haphazard, messy, undesired process. But it is evidence that the relations and fates of countries are irrevocably tied to each other. What is a nation, if not its people. And when people are flowing back and forth across these boundaries, it is evidence that those two countries are tied together as systems. So we see it in conflict, we see it in demographic flows, we see it in commodities trade, we see it in investment patterns. Because of course, it is the Gulf countries that lead the region in investing across the region. Especially, in war-torn countries, whether it is Iraq or whether its time to rehabilitate Lebanon. You can of course, extend this to North Africa. Egypt and other countries are very dependent on financial support, capital flows and fiscal assistance from Gulf countries, as well. And then, there is Turkey, as well, militarily and infrastructurally, when it comes to the Levant region. So, it is not happening in a pre-defined, supra-national, trans-sovereign in a multilateral way. It is happening bottom-up. It is happening based upon individual countries pursuing what they think is their national interest, very haphazardly but the fact that it is happening at all and that those interactions are more intense than 10 years ago, 20 years ago, 30 years ago is evidence that this Westasian region is finding ways –again not positive and I always emphasize this, its not about positive teleology, its not about becoming like European Union, there will never be an Asian Union, there will never be a single, recognized, a legitimate hegemon like China, that will never happen- Asia is not taking the European path. So it is this bottom-up, conflicted way but it is this intensity of relations. My hope is that because It is so chaotic, there isn`t a reason or pattern, so there is no predetermined direction, one hopes that countries say to themselves and to each other, we are fighting out pointlessly, we ́re going in circles, this makes no sense, maybe we need to have a regional forum and see if we can redraw the lines in a way that everyone agrees with. And that ́s how you move from tactics to strategy, that ́s how you move from reaction to foresight and that ́s how you move from conflict to slightly more stable vision. That ́s the best we can hope for, perhaps you agree, the best we can hope for, for the next 5 years.
B.M. - How do you interpret the latest standoff at the Eastern Mediterranean between France - Turkey - Greece?
P.K. - This is interesting. It ́s an example of number of things, first of all. It ́s an example of European countries like France having clear sense of who their allies and friends are in the region and again, they ́re still playing the kind of 19th century political alignments. On the other hand, it ́s also an example of an issue that I spend a lot of time working on, which is the geopolitics of infrastructure and what is known as the functional geography. So the geography of natural resource deposits and turning resources into reserves, those reserves then become contested in terms of their political designation, which EEZ they fall into. How does it relate to institutional arrangements. Cyprus is an EU member versus Turkey is a non-EU member. Others have made this case and I simply endorse their view, that before Cyprus was made an EU member, what in the condition should have been that there be a resolution to the Northern Cyprus dispute. Because then of course, Europe no longer has the institutional leverage and that conditionality. Europe, historically has made this mistake in other areas, as well, where it gives away, too much. Doesn ́t use the conditionality enough. Bargains it away by allowing Cyprus to be a member with a still active territorial dispute. As you know very well, it is within the articulation of European rules that countries with standing territorial disputes are not meant to be made EU members. An exception was made, here as a way of siding with Cyprus. As we can clearly tell from this dispute, it did not help resolve the dispute, at all. I think that is very problematic.
B.M. - Seems like Macron is trying to force out a European Army out of the situation. Are we moving towards a European Army and would that be something that accelerates a West Asian integration?
P.K. - Well, I think there are several things going on here at the same time that are beaconing of themselves, each as deep and interesting. The idea whether NATO ́s mission is sufficiently motivating for European countries to align and to create a common military directorate and so forth, this idea has been around since the 1950s and of course has nothing to do with Eastern or West Asian issues. Mostly to do with Russia. And even to this day, of course we don`t find that Russia is the sufficient motivating adversary for Europe to increase its defense spending or to form a common army. Now in the hierarchy of threats that Europe receives, what`s happening in the Eastern Mediterranean would rank very very low. So therefore, whatever Macron is thinking to himself, obviously this is not something that agitates the Germans, the Swedes or the Finns, or anyone, really...So what he is doing is of course, bilaterally motivated. As I said, this is just France being France and Macron thinking in 19th century terms. His attitudes on Turkey, on Russia and other issues differ quite considerably in some ways. Europe itself is not coherent whether the issue is geopolitical issues on the whole. Geopolitics, energy or other kinds of relations... By and large what we find is that European countries, particularly Germany, want to increase their commercial engagement very much with Russia and others. They strongly resent American interference in trying to isolate economic ties, that applies very much to Iran, so this is a good opportunity to bring Iran into the question. The Westasian role in the world economy and regional geopolitics and how it in some ways divides the West. Because on Russia and Iran, Europe and America differ quite considerably. I personally take the European view to the extend there is one. Because I do not see that the attempted isolation and sanctions of these very large countries actually been successful in bringing coercive, radical change. In the case of Iran, it hasn`t worked in more than 40 years. In the case of Russia, Putin has outlasted last three American elections and will probably outlast the next two. So, we should not adopt by default, an American mindset on these issues. We should actually adopt geographical mindset, which is that this is the geographical reality and to artificially try to suspend that reality by attending to isolate large countries with so many neighbours and such deep historical and economic ties with each other is quite simply foolish. We might as well, embrace the inevitability that eventually these countries are going to have to find a modus vivendi with each other and push in that direction. And so, intellectually I think Europeans are closer to that position than any American is.
B.M. - Going back to the West Asia, how much do you think Islam plays a role?
P.K. - I have long believed that it plays very little role, quite frankly. This is a debate that goes back to the 1990s when Samuel Huntington and others elevated the idea of cultural spheres into civilizational actors and that was a huge intellectual mistake. It was a methodological error that he made and obviously misdirected quite a lot of people. So Islam is a religion, one can refer to it as a cultural space but it cannot be seen as a civilizational actor, not since the Caliphates and even really arguably, the Ottoman Empire, not acting really on the behalf of globally, all Muslims. So you haven`t had a coherent, Islamic geopolitical identity or activism in many many centuries. Today, you certainly don`t have nothing of the sort. You have the internal cleavages between Sunni and Shia, the regional disparities or discrepancies such that they really have no connections with each other. North Africa does not have really meaningful ties to Indonesia, more or less zero, nor even to Pakistan. Other than Saudi Arabia`s relations with those countries which are a little bit more intense. So to speak of a common Islamic policy on anything is more or less a farce. And we`ve seen this twice in the last couple of decades. First in the condemnation of the American Gulf Wars and the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and military troop presence in the Gulf countries. Of course, nothing coherent was done against it and America considers many of these countries, some very strong allies. And then secondly of course, China and the Uyghurs where you have zero Islamic coherence of any kind. So I don`t think we should bring in religion. I think that religion should be thought of as a subordinate issue even in domestic politics, let alone international politics. Islam does not even pass the test of being a decisive factor in the domestic policies and attributes of governance in public policy in day to day level in most Islamic countries and again, I`m speaking about Indonesia, Pakistan, even more or less Egypt, which is of course a military dictatorship and of course, Muslim Brotherhood does not fare particularly well in these countries, even when it does fare well electorally as it did in Egypt, it is unable to govern. So if we think of these things logically and hierarchically, meaning actually reverse, from the bottom up. If Islam isn`t even effective in individual domestic context, we should be very dubious of the idea that it has any significance geopolitically and globally.
B.M. - One last question, then. Is China a "divider" or a "unifier” in the region?
P.K. - I think that`s a wonderful question, very interesting question because I`ve been looking at China`s growing role in West Asia for the last 15 years, its growing ties with the Gulf countries, the energy trade and what becomes as trade ties become investment ties, investment ties become military relations. Not alliances, but military ties. We see trade in weaponry, we see mutual kinds of activities in military spheres. if you will. And now we have more than 10 years of China ́s growing relations with Israel. We have Turkey as part of Belt and Road Initiative and the AIIB. Certainly, Russia is the most compliant country in the world when in comes to China ́s Belt and Road Initiative. Of course, China ́s presence in energy markets and infrastructure in Iraq. And now, eventually any Syrian post-conflict reconstruction. In India, one could say similar things, that India ́s growing ties and relations with the Westasian countries. India most certainly wants to have natural gas linkages from Iran, which is of course, something that the United States opposes and India is very much strengthening its ties with Israel, has very positive relations with Saudi Arabia. Obviously, the largest share of the foreign population in the Gulf countries is Indian nationals. So both China and India, over the last 30 years, much stronger roles, much more influential and to some degree constructive roles in the region. Whether it’s a uniter or a divider is of course, a much more complex question. Because China is trying to have positive ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia, at the same time. That creates some tension. Its trying to have positive ties with Israel, as well as, with Israel ́s adversaries at the same time. And this is the super-power diplomatic dilemma. How do you pursue your interests in the region with these countries that are antagonists and can China potentially, play a role in bringing about the Westasian forum? I don ́t think China is willing to stick its head out, yet, in that way. It ́s more interested in being a free-rider and getting bilaterally what it is looking for and that ́s sufficient for Chinese interests, for now. So, I wouldn ́t call it a uniter or divider, its more self- interested. But, as it relates to infrastructure projects in Belt and Road, I do think that in long term, one can envision that whether its gas pipelines, highways that cross to Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Iran to Turkey, the possibility of freight rail and other networks that do traverse from Turkey to Iran, to Pakistan and overland potentially to China, this does create a potential for adversarial neighbours to create more mutually beneficial relationship with each other based on economics and commerce. There ́s plenty of historical precedent for that, in the sense that if one finds one is sharing a railway or a pipeline or so forth and it does bring economic benefits to both sides, it is less likely that they will want to destroy that asset. We see cases of the opposite happening, as well. For example, Russia and Ukraine, both benefit from the gas pipelines that go from Russia to Ukraine then to Europe. But, that doesn`t stop Russia from invading Ukraine, right. So history provides us with a lot of evidence that infrastructure for trade and exchange usually beneficial in helping countries develop more positive relations. Of course, post-war history of Europe is the best positive example. But we also have negative examples. And again, this brings us to the present moment in West Asia. What will the countries decide to do? Countries rich in agriculture, in commodities, in oil and gas, in water versus those that are stark in them, those that have labour force versus those that need the labour force, and all of the other ways which Westasian countries could have a more optimal division of labour and even a more optimal political geography, there is a lot of progress we could envision and that we could physically map helping these governments to realize in a common forum with each other. But what is of course getting in the way, is the current geopolitical predicaments and tensions. So, we have to try to untie this knot that we are in right now.
B.M. - Wow! "Untying the Knots", was actually the title of my presentation defending my thesis.
P.K. - I ́d like to read that.
B.M. - Yeah, interesting that you ended the conversation with that. Quite fascinating! Thank you very much Dr. Khanna, I learnt so much from you, today. I hope to be with you, again maybe sometime in the future.
P.K. - My pleasure! Well Beste, good luck with The Westasian and I hope it grows beyond a publication into a great diplomatic initiative for the region. So, do keep in touch!
B.M. - Thank you, thank you very much!
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